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APOLLO SPACECRAfT 
Thr spacrcraft (S I C) cons iSIs of a launch rsca~ syslrm {LES) assrm­
bly. command modulr (C/~I). "rrvicr modulr (S / M). and Ihr spacrcraftl 
lunar modulr adaplrr (SLA). Thr LES assrmbly providrs 1M lMans f(X 
rapidlv s"paralin!,: thr C / \I from Ihr S/M durin!,: pad (X suborbilal aborls. 
Th.. C/ \I !orms thr spacrcraft control crntrr. conlains nrcrssary aulo­
malic and manual rquipmrnt to conlrol and monitor Ihr spacrcraft 
svstrms. and contains thr rrquirrd rquipmrnl for safrty and comfort of 
thr errw. Thr S/ ~I is a cylindrical strurturr localrd ~Iwrrn Ihr C / M 
and thr SLA. It contains thr propulsion systrms for altiludr and Vf'loc· 
itl' chan!l:r manru\'rrs . ~Iost of thr consumablrs usrd in Ihr mission arr 
storrd in thr S/ M. Thr SLA is .. truncalrd conr which conn~cls Ih~ 
S/ \I 10 Ihr launch "rhiclr. II also pro"idrs thr spacr whrr~in Ihr lunar 
modulr (L/~I) is carrird on lunar missions. 
TEST IN PROGRESS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT 
Spacrcraft 012 was undrr!loin ,'1 a "Plu!lS OUI Inl~gralrd Trsl" at Ih~ 
limr of thr accidrnt on January 'l.i. 196i. O~ralional Ch~ckoul Procr· 
durr. drsi~nalrd OCP FO·K·OO21·1 applird 10 this IUt. Wilhin Ihis 
rrport this procrdurr is oftrn rrfrrrrd 10 as OCP·OO21. 
TESTS AND ANALYSES 
Rrsults of Irsls and analysrs not compl~lr 011 Ih~ lilM of publicalion 
of this rrport will br conlainrd in Ap~ndix G. Addrnda and Corrigrnda. 
CONVERSION Of TIME 
Throughoul Ihis r~porl. limr is slalrd in Gr~~nwich Mean Ti_ (GMT). 
To conv~rt GMT 10 Easl~rn Slandard TilM (EST). sublracl 17 hours. 
For example, 2~:~1 GMT convrrled is 6:~1 p.m. EST. 
For 861e by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
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SAFETY OF INVESTIGATION OPERATIONS 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Safety of Investigation Operations Panel, 19. The 
task assigned for accomplishment by Panel 19 was prescribed as follows: 
This group is charged with the responsibility of reviewing all operations performed during 
the investigation to assure that all personnel safety requirements are adequately maintained . 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. 	MEMBERSHIP 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Safety of Investigation Oper­
ations Panel: 
Mr. J. R. Atkins, Chairman, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. J. McCaugh, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Lt. Col. J. Rawers, U . S. Air Force, Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) 
Mr. R. Walker, Bendix Corporation, KSC 
Mr. D. Karl, Pan American Airways, AFETR 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Mr. E. Barton Geer, Langley Research Center (LaRC), NASA, Board Member, was assigned to 
monitor the Safety of Investigation Operations Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. The compOSitIOn of this Panel reflected the incorporation of operations safety as identified in the 
Kennedy Space Center, Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) Agreements (Enclosure 19-1). Launch 
Complex 34 is a NASA-KSC owned facility located on AFETR property at Cape Kennedy Air Force 
Station (CKAFS). Therefore, the Air Force exercises prime responsibility which is normal for the host 
Commander, NASA exercises safety responsibility for all NASA personnel, facilities and equipment 
located at AFETR. 
2. All hazardous operations performed by NASA and their contractors at KSC and CKAFS by the 
requirements of Kennedy Management Instruction (KMI) 1710.1 are subject to Safety Office approval. 
The Uprated Saturn Ground Safety Plan delineates the safety considerations that must be satisfied 
during the performance of those checkout operations deemed hazardous. In consonance with the policy 
of KMI 1710.1, the Panel provided a technical safety review of all post-accident procedures employed 
in the disassembly, handling, storage and testing of Space Vehicle AS-204. In addition, selected oper­
ations and tests were monitored by a member of the safety organization. Monitoring of operations 
included: assuring use of required protective equipment; presence of special support, i.e., fire/medical; 
presence of only essential personnel; and rigorous adherence to the procedures written by the other 
Panels in the form of Test Preparation Sheets (TPS). 
3. Safety support at Launch Complex 34 was given continuous coverage from January 31 through 
February 23, 1967. This safety support commenced with removal of launch vehicle ordnance at Launch 
Complex 34, and concluded with the arrival of the AS-204 Service Module at the Manned Spacecraft 
Operations Building. 
~. The disassembly and removal of the Spacecraft from Launch Complex 34 was performed without 
incident. Ordnance, toxic materials, high-pressure vessels and structural weakness were typical prob­
lem considerations which had to be taken into account during the disassembly, transfer, storage, and 
clean-up or' Launch Complex 34. Periodic spacecraft air samples for beryllium were taken at selected 
intervals at Launch Complex 34 and the Pyrotechnic Installation Building (PIB). Air samples for beryl ­
lium were taken inside the cabin as a precautionary measure due to the indicated presence of beryllium 
dust from swab tests taken on the exterior of the Spacecraft after the accident. All tests proved to be 
negative. 
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5. Concurrent with the activity on Launch Complex 34, the PIB and the Materials Analysis Branch 
laboratory were utilized in support of the investigation. Special arrangements with regard to exits were 
required in the PIB once it was established as the area for AS-204 storage. Special tests involving 
oxygen-enriched atmospheres required establishment of safety requirements and safety support during 
actual performance. These special tests were performed for the purpose of determining burning rates 
and ignition characteristics of various materials . 
6. Following are items of general interest: 
a. There was no indication of beryllium at toxic levels during handling and disassembly at Launch 
Complex 34 and the PIB. 
b. The Environmental Control System (ECS) surge tank was the only pressure vessel activated 
during the Plugs Out Overall Test and did not present a hazard to disassembly personnel. 
c. Hypergolic propellants were present only in the Ground Support Equipment and did not present 
a hazard over and above that established for Launch Complex operations. 
d. No cryogenic propellants were present in the spacecraft. Oxygen was supplied in gaseous form 
from a source external to the spacecraft. 
e. The Launch Escape System did not have initiators installed, thereby negating the need for 
special de-arming action prior to removal. 
f. The ordnance in the forward section under the heat shield was removed as a precautionary 
measure because of possible damage to the forward bulkhead that may have been weakened by 
the fire. The r.emainder of the spacecraft ordnance was identified and did not constitute a hazard . 
g. Adequate safeguards for personal protection were taken during test operations. 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
Not applicable. 
E. SUPPORTI NG DAT A 
Enclosure 
19-1 	 Extract, KSCj AFETR Joint Operating and Support Agreement KMI 1052.1, July 12, 
1965 Pages D-8, D-9, 6 and Authority 
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KMI 1052. 1 
March 9, 1965 
Ellectlve Date 
JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, NASA 
MANAGEMENT INSTRUCTION 
KSC / AFETR JOINT OPERATING ANDSUBJECT 
SUPPORT AGREEMENT 
1. PURPOSE 
This Instruction incorporates into the KSC Issuance System 
an agreement between the John F. Kennedy Space Center and 
the Air Force Eastern Test Range (Attaclunent A) cO!1cerning 
the responsibilities for performance of operating and support 
functions that are intrinsic to the mission assignments of both 
agencies. 
2. AUTHORITY 
NMI 1052. 31, "DOD/ NASA Agreement - Atlantic Missile Range 
and Merritt Island Launch Area. " 
3. SUPERSESSION 
Administrative Regulation KSC 4-2, dated March 9, 1965. 
r(·)~ 
~~1tschell 
Chief, Administrative Branch 
Administrative and Transportation Services Office 
Attaclunent: 
A. Agreement 
Distribution "H" 
ENCLOSURE 19·1 
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ATTACHMENT A to 
KMI 1052.1 
13. Ground Safety 
a. Safety policy and operation procedure on the ETR is the 
responsiLility of the Commander, AFETR . DOD and r~ASA Test Activities 
are responsiule for compliance with these policies and procedures as 
fOriliulated by the pertinent AF regulations and docLiments, and by 
established practices. 
b. Tile Director, KSC, is responsible for: 
(1) Designating launch danger areas on MILA, and clearing 
these danger areas or accepting the risk for persons remaining therein . 
When deemed necessary by the Director, KSC, and subject to the possible 
imposition of additional launch or trajectory limitations by the Commander, 
AFETR, the location of il lipact limit lines may be jointly agreed upon by 
the Director, KSC, and the Commander, AFETR . 
(2 ) Protection of life and property that could be endangered: 
(a) During the transportation (on MILA), assembly. 
checkout, static firing, or preparation of launch of all space vehicles/ 
missiles to be launched or intended for launch from MILA. 
(b) Gy propellants or ordnance items during their 
transportation (on MILA) to and from storage or manufacture in MILA 
facilities. 
(3) Limiting access to MILA areas which are inside designated 
impact limit lines. 
(4) Evaluating hazards to MILA areas and t~e general public 
associated with MILA preflight operations. 
(5) Providing data on toxicological and radiological mater­
ials, systems and procedures govprning their use as AFETR may require to 
develop emergency plans or determine launch restrictions and such static 
instrumentation on HILA as AFETR and KSC may jointly agree is required 
for detecting and estimating the behavior of toxicological and radiologi­
cal hazards. 
c. The assignment of responsibilities in paragraphs a and b. 
above, is not intended to prohibit or discourage the generation of 
safety policies and procedures which are internal to an organization. 
However, internal policies and procedures will not circumvent, negate or 
be less stringent than those prescribed by the agency with the primary 
safety responsibility. 
d. The area between the overlapping 0.4 psi launch danger 
circles of Complexes 39A (Saturn V) and 41 (Titan III) will be under 
operational security control of eitber KSC or AFETR, depending upon 
which complex is involved in launch operations. Should launch opera­
tions on both complexes require simultaneous placement of roadblocks, 
their points of intersection will be mutually agreed upon. 
e. AFETR and KSC safety representatives will keep each other 
informed of their respective safety practices, policies and procedures. 
These representatives will, where applicable, prepare uniform safety 
criteria which are of mutual interest. 
ENCLOSURE 19-1 
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8. EFFECTIVE DATE : 
This Agreement becomes effective upon the date of the latest 
signature shown below 
V. G. HUSTON, Major General, usAF KURT H. DEBUS 
ComOlan(1er, AFETR Director, KSC 
ENCLOSURE 19-1 
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IN-FLIGHT FIRE EMERGENCY PROVISIONS REVIEW 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the In-flight Fire Emergency Provisions Review Panel, 
Panel 20. The task assigned for accomplishment by Panel 20 was prescribed as follows: 
This activity involves an orderly review of planned in-flight fire emergency procedures and 
other provisions relative to their adequacy, as well as a review to detennine that emergency pro­
cedures, in fact, exist for all appropriate activities. This review should include recommendations 
to the Board for changes in existing procedures and other provisions and for the creation of new 
emergency provisions if deemed necessary. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. 	MEMBERSHIP: 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the In-flight Fire Emergency Pro­
visions Review 	Panel: 
Captain James A. Lovell, Jr., USN, Chairman, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
LCdr. Ronald E. Evans, USN, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr.John L. Swigert,Jr., Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mt. Richard D. Glover, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Thomas R. Loe, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Dickie K. Warren, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Norman P. Shyken, McDonnell Company 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Colonel Frank Borman, U. S. Air Force, Board Member, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA, 
was assigned to monitor the In-flight Fire Emergency Provisions Review Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. In response to the direction of the Apollo 204 Review Board, the Panel derived detailed objectives. 
These objectives were: determine if in-flight fire procedures were available; determine the severity of 
and the time available to combat an in-flight fire; determine the adequacy of existing procedures estab­
lished for Apollo 204 to combat an in-flight fire; recommend the development of new hardware and/or 
emergency procedures for the Apollo Command Module, if necessary. 
2. PUBLISHED PROCEDURES. The in-flight fire emergency procedures in use by the Apollo 204 crew­
men are described below. 
a. APOLLO CREW ABBREVIATED CHECKLIST, MISSION AS-204, dated January 23, 1967; 
Fire/Smoke in C/M, page 15-1 (Enclosure 20-1). The procedure is composed of two major steps, 
seven total, to don the Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA), if applicable, and to vent the main 
cabin to ambient pressure . The emergency procedure utilizes the orbital PGA donning procedure 
and the normal cabin depressurization hardware. No other provisions are made for extinguishmg or 
combating in-flight fires. This procedure is the most complete of the group and is as follows: 
ASSIGNED CREWMAN TASK 

All three crewmen Don PGA 

Command Pilot Direct 02 valve - Open 

Senior Pilot Emergency Cabin Pressure - Off 

Senior Pilot Cabin Repress valve - Closed 

Pilot Suit Fan - Off 

Pilot Cabin Fan - Off 

Command Pilot Cabin Pressure Relief - Dump 
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As a procedure in donning the prcssurc suits (Enclosure 20·4), the following Environmental 
Control System (ECS) controls must bc activated or verified: 
(1) ECS suit umbilical inlet· Uncapped 
(2) Suit circuit return air valvc . (;Iosed 
(3) Suit demand pressure regulator - 1 and 2 
(4) Suit compressors - Compr 1 (or 2) . AC 1 (or 2) 
(5) Suit flow control· Suit full flow (3 separate suit flow control levers) 
b. APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE, SPACE­
CRAFT 012, dated November 12, 19()o. with changes dated No"rmber 18 and 30, 1966; Firel 
Smoke in CIM, paragraph 9.3.1, pages 9·49. (Enclosure 20·2) The procedure is essentially the same 
as paragraph l.a., except that it contains no provisions for turning off the cabin vent fan and suit 
loop compressor fans. An additional step of closing the suit circuit return air valve as stated in the 
pressure suit donning procedure is included. 
c. FLIGHT MISSION RULES, AS·204, dated January 10, 1967; Section 6, Environmental Control, 
items 6·21 and 6·22, page 6·6 (Enclosure 20·3), contain references to in· flight fires as follows: 
ITEM MALFUNCTION 	 RULING 
6·12 Smoke or annoying 	 CONTINUE MISSION Open Direct 02 
odors in suit circuit to purge suits 
6·22 	 Smoke in cabin CONTINUE- MISSION Turn off cabin 
fan . Crew may elect to abort if source of 
smoke cannot be located and contained. 
NOTE: Crew may elect to decompress cabin 
d. APOLLO AS·204 FLIGHT PLAN dated December 9, 1966; pages 97 and 98. (Enclosure 20·4) 
The flight plan contains a PGA donning procedure planned for use at 27 hours into the mission . 
The exercise is scheduled after the initial PGA removal and is included as an evaluation of the suit 
don· doff task. It is not a complete in· flight fire emergency procedure. 
3. CREW TRAINING. Records of specific Apollo crew training lectures on in·flight fire, per se, are not 
available. However, briefings were held with the prime Apollo crew describing the best PGA stowage 
configuration and donning procedures which resulted in the minimum suit donning times. These proced· 
ures were developed and are available in MSC test report CSD·A·288 (STB-A·015/29). This report also 
mentions that a well trained test subject accomplished the PGA donning in about 11 minutes at one g. 
Apollo Mission Simulator (AMS) training records indicate the prime Apollo crew donned the PGA's in 
the AMS at least twice; even though PGA doffing or donning is not necessarily logged. The crew speci. 
fically requested that the donning time be recorded during one PGA donning exercise. This time was 
about eight and a half minutes. 
4. PROCEDURE EVALUATION. On February 5, 1967, two members of the Apollo 204 backup crew 
and a member from Panel 20 conducted a run-through of the in· flight fire procedures as published in 
the on board check lists (Enclosure 20-1). The purpose of the exercise was to determine the degree of 
difficulty and time required to perform the in· flight fire emergency procedure. The check list did not 
specify any variations of the procedure for the different phases of flight. Therefore, the worst case was 
assumed; i.e., orbital phase with crewmen in constant wear garments and pressure suits stowed. 
The basic concept of the Apollo in-flight fire procedure was to depressurize the cabin to extinguish 
the fire. This meant that the first step was to don the PGA. The PGA and associated helmets were 
stowed under the couches in the orbital configuration. Donning procedures as shown in the final flight 
plan were followed (Enclosure 20·4). The test crew performed the emergency procedure in approximately 
12 minutes. It was obvious that the degree of training and peculiar suit donning problems, such as 
getting zippers caught, could cause a variation in that time. However, for emergency pressure suit 
donning, with an actual fire condition the crew has the additional hazardof staying clear of the fire. This 
will add to the donning time. The process of suit donning will increase the air circulation in the cabin 
Dy feeding new oxygen to the burning material and increasing propagation of the fire. Pressure suit don· 
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ning as a first step toward combating an in-flight spacccra[L £ire requires too much time and adds to se­
verity of the fire. For fires during boost and entry phases of flight, the crewmen are wearing PGA's and 
this problem does not exist. 
All existing in-flight fire procedures center around extinguishing the fire by venting the cabin to 
remove all oxygen, allowing the fire zone to cool, and repressurizing the cabin. The systems manage­
ment functions which accompany this vary with mission phase. During launch, entry, and any other 
time crew is suited, the only operation required is to open the cabin dump valve. (Note that below 
approximately 28,000 feet alittude, during earth landing sequence, this operation accomplishes nothing 
since atmosphere is beginning to enter through inflow valves in the cabin pressure relief assembly.) 
During flight phases where the crew is unsuited, the procedure calls for donning suits as soon as possible, 
isolating suit circuit from cabin, and venting. Several systems functions are required to assure the most 
rapid cabin vent after the PGA's are donned, and would normally be done prior to beginning PGA 
donning; Two of the functions can be done by the Command Pilot from the left-hand couch, and 
two by the Senior Pilot in the Left Hand Equipment Bay (LHEB). In considering these functions, 
several comments are in order: 
a. DIRECT 02 - CLOSED. One T-handle is normally installed in this valve and is readily access­
ible to the Command Pilot. This is the easiest of the four functions to perform, when the handle 
is installed in the valve. 
b. SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN AIR VALVE - CLOSED. This function is required to assure the 
suit circuit is isolated from any cabin contamination caused by the fire. This valve is located in 
the space behind the removable attenuation panel covering LHEB panel 311. In orbit, this panel 
is off and stowed. The valve is closed by hand and can be reached either from the left-hand 
couch or from below. However, the valve assembly is recessed and difficult to reach. 
c. CABIN REPRESS VALVE - CLOSED. This valve is normally closed and must be verified 
closed by the Senior Pilot while he is in the Lower Equipment Bay preparing to unstow the PGA's. 
The valve is activ'ated by rotating a three-quarter inch diameter knurled knob on LHEB panel 
314. This operation is fairly easy to accomplish in the shirtsleeve environment. However, since 
this small knob only extends out from the panel about three-quarters of an inch and is located 
under the left-hand couch, it would be difficult to operate in a fully pressurized PGA. 
d. EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE - OFF. This valve is located on panel 314 and will nor­
mally be open for emergency pressure resulting from meteoroid cabin penetration . This valve must 
be closed prior to cabin vent to prevent surge tank depletion . The operation requires the Senior 
Pilot to remove the second T-handle from its stowed position on panel 314, insert in the emergency 
regulators valve and turn it to Off one-half turn . This valve cannot be moved without aT-handle 
and if the handle is not in its usual stowage position or if hazardous conditions exist, time could 
be lost in performing this mandatory function . The Senior Pilot is also responsible for the PGA 
unstowage. 
e. CABIN FANS - OFF. Air movement in the cabin caused by the cabin fans, coupled with the 
location of the combustible materials, contributes to fire propagation. 
5 . FIRE PROPAGATION. A review of 100%, 5 pounds per square inch (psi) oxygen fire technical 
publications was made to determine the time available for crewmen of Apollo 204 to fight an in-flight 
fire. The review indicates that time available for crewmen to combat an in-flight fire is a function of 
fire propagation through the spacecraft, the ability to rapidly detect its presence and the span of useful 
consciousness. Fire propagation in the spacecraft is affected by several factors: 
a. Cabin oxygen pressure 
b. Presence and proximity of combustible materials 
c. Location of the point of ignition energy source 
d. Acceleration forces acting on the combustion process 
F ire propagation roles of these factors during boost and entry phases of flight would be similar to 
the ground environment. The cabin oxygen pressure is the exception and will vary directly with ambient 
pressure changes, as long as ambient pressure is above approximately 5·6 psi. Fire propagation time is 
a function of the oxygen pressure. Venting the cabin to ambient pressure would reduce oxygen pressure 
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and fire propagation rates during the boost and orbital phase of flight. Because of the high accelerations 
involved and the requirement for being restrained, fire detection Elther than by visual means would be 
difficult during the boost and entry phases of flight. 
The crew would be less alert to the danger of fire during these phases of flight because of attention 
to flight control duties and the environment of maximum dynamic pressure buffet, aerodynamic noise and 
attention to procedures . The pressure suit circuit would be closed to the cabin with no physiological 
indications. After detection, any action to combat the fire would be greatly impeded by the high accel­
eration loads on the crewmen. 
Combustion in a zero g environment is affected by the same considerations, except that normal, 
buoyant, thermal convections are not present. The flame would normally assume a spherical pattern but 
would be affected by the actual shape of the surface that is burning and air circulation. In addition, any 
changes to the g field such as thruster firing would affect the pattern. The fire in zero g may propagate 
along the burning surface or by the omni-directional emission of burning gases generated by pyrolysis 
of the burning material. The distance such gas jets will extend depends on the configuration and kind 
of material that is burning. If combustion is confined without an additional oxygen supply, visible flame 
disappears. However, any disturbance of the surface before it has cooled will introduce additional oxy­
gen causing it to flare up again. Any movements of the spacecraft or crewmen in attempting to combat 
the fire may be expected to make more oxygen available and thus intensify the fire. Only after sufficient 
thermal energy has been dissipated will the fire not be kindled by convection currents. Therefore, theo­
retical considerations and limited experimental evidence indicates that fire propagation may be reduced 
in zero g environment depending on practical aspects that are not yet fully understood. However, due to 
other variables, it cannot be concluded that a zero g environment will'effectively reduce the spread of 
the fire in the cabin. 
A fire test (Test No. 2-TS47-SMD 3) in an Apollo boilerplate spacecraft was conducted by the 
Structural and Mechanics Division of the Manned Spacecraft Center under in-flight conditions of 100% 
oxygen at 5 psi atmosphere and with the flammable materials scheduled to be aboard Apollo 204 for 
flight. The vent valve was ported to vacuum to simulate orbital flight and opened at approximately 6 
psi. The fire was started near the -V , +2 corner close to the aft bulkhead of the spacecraft with the 
cabin fan on. 
Preliminary results indicate that a fire under 5 psi 100% oxygen is less severe than a fire at Launch 
Complex conditions of 16 psi. The temperature peak of the fire test at 5 psi occurred approximately 80 
to 90 seconds after ignition . This was approximately 50 seconds later than on a similar test at 16 psi . 
The damage was confined to the left one-third of the cabin and the vent valve was able to control 
the rise in pressure. It appeared that vent valve operation helped exhaust the oxygen supply and limit 
the severity of this fire; however, a considerable amount of smoke was generated during the fire indica­
ting a need for crew protection from smoke. The results of these investigations indicate that although an 
in-flight fire would be less severe than a fire under flight conditions, there was still a high prooability 
of an uncontrolled propagation of fire for all phases of flight with the combustiole materials that were 
on board Apollo 204. 
6. CABIN PRESSURE VENTS 
a. CABIN PRESSURE VENTS DURING LAUNCH. The cabin is maintained at approximately 
1 psi above ambient pressure from the time of cabin oxygen purge until lift-off to prevent ambient 
flow into the cabin during prelaunch operations. The lift-off cabin pressure is approximately 16 psi 
absolute (psia), 100% oxygen . The cabin pressure remains at 16 psia until an elapsed time from 
lift-off of approximately 45 seconds. At this time the spacecraft is at an altitude of 10,000 feet 
with the ambient pressure at 10 psia . Any attempts to vent the cabin pressure prior to 45 seconds 
will accomplish no more than reducing the cabin pressure to ambient , somewhere between 14.7 
psi a and 10 psia. Opening the cabin relief valve at any time during the boost or orbit phases will 
in no way dilute the oxygen concentration in the cabin. It will serve only to reduce the pressure 
of the 100% oxygen. 
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Once the spacecraft has reached an altitude (approximately 10,000 feet) where the cabin press­
ure exceeds the ambient pressure by 6 psi, the cabin pressure relief valves will open venting cabin 
pressure. From this point until the ambient pressure has decreased to zero, the cabin pressure relief 
valves modulate to maintain 6 psi differential, finally sealing the cabin at 6 psia. It is impossible 
to manually vent the cabin at a rate faster than the relief valves can follow the decrease in am­
bient pressure. Therefore, cabin pressure vent times to 0.5 psi a from lift-off to orbital insertion 
can vary from 3 minutes 20 seconds to 2 minutes 5 seconds. 
To vent cabin atmosphere during the launch phase, the Command Pilot must release the latch 
on the cabin pressure relief valve and place the handle in the dump position. In the launch con­
figuration, the crew is suited, the emergency cabin pressure selector valve is set to Off, and the 
suit circuit return air valve is closed . 
b. CABIN PRESSURE VENT DURING ORBIT. The venting of cabin pressure was the only 
method available for Apollo crewmen to use in extinguishing a fire. The procedures and times for 
venting the cabin are covered in other areas of this report so only the time required to evacuate 
the cabin to 0.5 psi a will be discussed. Based on reference material, it was assumed that 0 .5 psi 
was the maximum pressure that could be utilized to effectively retard an in-flight fire. Figure 
2.7-11 of the Apollo Operations Handbook (Enclosure 20-5) shows that the time required to de­
pressurize the cabin from 5 to 0 .5 psi a is 1 minute and 45 seconds. It can be noted on the ref­
erenced figure that due to the relatively higher differential pressures present when the cabin venting 
is initiated, the initial depressurization rate is quite rapid. As an example, the time required to drop 
cabin pressure from 5 to 2 psia is only 45 seconds. 
The Post Landing Ventilation Valves (PLV) can provide a method for decompressing the cabin 
more rapidly than the normal method described above. These valves allow cabin pressure to vent 
in less than 10 seconds; however, this method should not be used in the case of fire since the vent 
point is under the Apex cover where the parachutes are stowed. The introduction of fire or hot 
gases to this area could damage or destroy the parachutes. 
c. CABIN PRESSURE VENTING DURING ENTRY. Cabin pressure may be vented during the 
entry with the pressure level dependent on the ambient pressure. It should be noted that venting the 
cabin to ambient will only serve to lower the total pressure and will not dilute the 100% oxygen 
concentration. The considerations that applied to orbital use of the PLV valves would also apply. 
Once the spacecraft has descended to approximately 26,000 feet , it will no longer be possible to 
lower cabin pressure by opening the dump valve. From this altitude until splashdown, the cabin 
pressure will be increasing and because of ambient inflow, the oxygen concentration will become 
diluted to a value of approximately 50% . The length of time from 26,000 feet to splashdown is 
approximately 6 minutes. 
A cabin pressure vent during the entry phase of flight or immediately before will result in an 
inflated pressure suit entry, since there is insufficient time to repressurize the cabin . The inflated 
pressure Suit limits mobility and complicates the entry portion of the flight. 
7 . CABIN REPRESSURIZATION. Assuming the crew has been able to perform all necessary tasks 
and the fire has been extinguished by venting the cabin, the problem of cabin repressurization arises. 
Provided no further fire hazard exists, cabin repressurization is desirable to make entry preparations 
and entry easier. When an extended period of time for return is required, repressurization is mandatory for 
biological functions. The two problem areas which exist in repressurization are: accessibility of repres­
surization are: accessibility of repressurization controls in inflated suit configuration, and repressuri­
zation profile. 
Two modes of cabin repressurization exist: (1) a normal procedure requmng 74 minutes to reach 
5.0 psia and (2) a minimum time procedure requiring 52 minutes to reach 5 .0 psia. In the latter case, 
the 22 minutes are saved by first venting the contents of the surge tank to achieve l.9 psia cabin 
pressure in slightly less than 5 minutes, then followed by the slower rise to 5 .0 psia. Both of these 
procedures require the Senior Pilot to go to LHEB panel 314 and open the cabin repressurization valve 
D-20-7 

using a knurled knob which must be grasped with an inflated glove and turned one-half turn. If the 
normal repressurization profile is to be followed, no further action is required until the cabin reaches 
5.0 psia in 74 minutes when the repressurization valve is closed. The- gloves will probably have been 
removed by this time making the job somewhat easier. For emergencies, 22 minutes may be saved by 
venting the contents of surge tank from 900 to 150 psia. After the repressurization valve has been 
opened, the T-handle is removed from its stowage hole, inserted in the emergency cabin pressure regu­
lator valve and turned one-half turn to 1 and 2 position, with inflated gloves. This immediately initiates 
maximum flow from the system (0 .67 pounds per minute) and the surge tank contents begin venting 
into the cabin. The Pilot, from the right-hand couch, must monitor the surge tank pressure continuously 
for the remainder of the 52 minutes required to reach 5.0 psia. He must keep the Senior Pilot aware 
of the pressure to prevent tank pressure from falling below 150 psia, causing main regulator malfunct­
ions. When pressure first falls to 150 psi, the emergency cabin pressure regulator must be turned Off. 
At this time cabin pressure is approximately 1.9 psia and the elapsed time is approximately 5 minutes. 
Thereafter, repressurization flow must be modulated to maintain 150 psia until the valve is again full 
open and surge tank pressure begins to rise slowly. When the cabin reaches 3.5 psia and the main 
cabin regulators cut in, an additional demand is placed on the surge tank. Surge tank pressure will 
again fall to 150 psia at which time the repressurization flow must be again modulated to maintain 
this minimum pressure. When the cabin reaches 5.0 psia, the cabin repressurization valve is closed and 
surge tank recharging from the Service Module cryogenic oxygen supply begins and requires approxi­
mately one-half hour to complete. The continuous attention to surge tank pressure required in this 
repressurization procedure is not desirable. Enclosure 20-5 shows the cabin pressure histories profiles 
for the two repressurization modes. The time required for repressurization is too long in either case 
because of two systems constraints: (1) the total available oxygen within the surge tank is only a frac­
tion of that required for one Command Module repressurization cycle and (2) resupply flow rates from 
the Service Module cryogenic oxygen tanks to the surge tank are severely limited by flow restrictors 
(6 pounds per hour nominal). Repressurization is a lengthy process at best, and is hampered by inacces­
sible Environmental Control Unit management controls. In the case of the minimum time profile, a 
great deal of voice coordination between crewmen is required since the repressurization valve and the 
surge tank pressure readout are located in opposite ends of the spacecraft. In addition, possible suit 
damage due to the fire makes lengthy repressurization times undesirable. 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. FINDING 
An in-flight fire procedure was published and available to the crew for the Apollo 204 Mission. 
The procedure was analyzed with reference to the Apollo 204 Command Module 012 configuration. 
DETERMINATION 
Based on this review, it is the judgment that the existing in-flight fire procedures are deficient in 
the following areas: 
a . The cabin fans should be turned off as the first item of the procedural check list. This may help 
prevent the spread of a fire by minimizing cabin air currents. 
b. The procedure should have specified the length of time to keep the cabin depressurized to insure 
the fire had been extinguished and that all materials had cooled to below their ignition temperature. 
2. 	FINDING 
The Apollo 204 crew had practiced the PGA donning portion of the in-flight fire procedure. 
DETERMINATION 
No discrepancies were noted. 
3. FINDING 
Coordination with Panel 8, Materials Review, and Panel 5, Origin and Propagation of Fire, indi­
cates many materials combustible in 100% 5 psi oxygen were on board Apollo 204 Command Module 012. 
D-20-8 
DETERMINATION 
It is the judgment of the Panel .that these materials would yield a dangerous propagation rate In 
case of fire in the Command Module during the boost, orbital and entry phases of flight. 
4. 	FINDING 
Lenghty suit donning times were incompatible with fire propagation times. 
DETERMINATION 
The published in-flight fire procedure was impractical in view of the rapid fire propagation rate 
expected for an Apollo 204 in-flight fire. 
5. FINDING 
The Command Module depressurization time from 5 psi to 0.5 psi can vary from 1 minute and 45 
seconds to 3 minutes and 20 seconds based on the flight phase ambient pressure. 
DETERMINATION 
The depressurization time is too slow to effectively combat a cabin fire . 
6. 	FINDING 
The emergency cabin repressurization time from a vacuum to 3.5 psi is 35 minutes. 
DETERMINATION 
The time required to repressurize the cabin to a minimum acceptable pressure is excessive In view 
of the possible fire damage to the closed loop pressure suit circuit. 
7. FINDING 
Actuation of the suit circuit return valve, the cabin repressurization valve, and emergency cabin 
repressurization valve are critical in producing an adequate cabin decompression and subsequent re­
pressurization. 
DETERMINATION 
The placement of ECS controls and displays complicates the execution of the existing in-flight fire 
procedure. 
E. SUPPORTING DATA 
Enclosures 
20-1 Apollo Crew Abbreviated Checklist Mossion AS-204, page 15-1 , dated January 23, 1967 
20-2 Apollo Operations Handbook, NAA SM2A-03-SC-012, dated November 1966, page 9-49 
20-3 Flight Mission Rules, AS-204, dated January 10, 1967, page 6-6 
20-4 Apollo AS-204A Flight Plan, dated December 9, 1966, pages 97 and 98 
20-5 Apollo Operations Handbook, NAA SM2A-03-SC-012, dated 12 November 1966, pages 
2.7-40, 2.7-42, 2.7-43 
20-6 List of References 
20-7 Glossary of Abbreviations 
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15-1 
SECTION 15. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
FIRE/SMOKE IN C/M 
CSP DON PGAs 
2 SET CONTROLS 
C 
S 
DIRECT 02 - OPEN (CCW)
EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE - OFF Panel 314 
CABIN REPRESS - CLOSED (CCW)
SUIT FAN - OFF · 
CABIN FAN - OFF 
C CABIN PRESSURE RELIEF - DUMP Panel 307 
(Safety latch - off) 
Extracted from: APOLLO CREW ABBREVIATED CHECKLIST 
MISSION AS-204 
January 23, 1967 
ENCLOSURE 20·1 
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PGA 	 DONNING 
GET 	 27:30 
GET 	 325:00 
1. 	 Configuration: 
A. 	 Cabin humidity taken prior to doffing PGA 
B. 	 ECS suit umbilical inlet capped 
C. 	 Normal ECS shirtsleeve configuration 
D. 	 Three men in couches, wearing light coveralls, 
sandals, and communications carrier. 
E. 	 Helmets stowed in bags under center couch. 
F. 	 Commander's (C) PGA stowed in bag under LH 
couch. 
G. 	 Senior Pilot's (S) PGA stowed in bag under 
LH couch. 
H. 	 Pilot's (p) PGA stowed in bag under RH couch 
near headrest 
I. 	 TV and seq. CAM - Setup 
J. 	 Interior lights - All ON 
2. 	 Unstow PGAs 
A. 	 C,S,P - Release couch restraints 
B. 	 S - Drop center couch to 180 0 position, in­
gress LEB, fold couch to 270 0 position. 
C. 	 C,S,P - Remove light coveralls, restraint 
sandals, bioinstrumentation, and communicatim 
connectors. 
D. 	 C,P - Pass Light coveralls, etc, to S 
E. 	 S - Retrieve C's PGA and pass to C 
F. 	 P - Rollover, drop couch headrest and re­
. 
trieve suit from RH bag • 
G. 	 S - Stow light coveralls, etc, in LH suit bag 
H. 	 S - Retrieve three helmets in bags from aft 
bulkhead, stow on center couch. 
I. 	 S - Retrieve S's suit 
Prior to donningPGAs verify: 
A. 	 ECS suit umbilical inlet - UNCAPPED 
B. 	 SUIT CIRCUIT RETURN AIR VALVE - CLOSED 
C. 	 SUIT DEMAND PRESSURE REGULATOR 1 & 2 
D. 	 SUIT COMPRESSORS - COMPR 1 (or 2) - ACI (or2) 
E. 	 SUIT FLOW CONTROL- SUIT FULL FLOW 
ENCLOSURE 20·4 
0·20·16 
4. Don PGA's 
A. 	 C - Don PGA in LB couch 

P - Don PGA in RH couch 

S - Don PGA in LEB 

B. 	 C,P,S - Remove helmets from bags and st ow 
bags under respective couches 
C. 	 UCD donned 
D. 	 Bio-med connector from underwear to suit 
attached. 
E. 	 Restraint zipper closed and lanyard stowed 
F. 	 Pressure sealing zipper closed, snap secure 
G. 	 Don helmet: helmet comm. disconnect attached 
to suit disconnect and stowed 
H. 	 Helmet attached to neckring and locked in 
position. 
I. 	 Glove/ wrist disconnect locked 
J. 	 Glove straps snagged down 
K. 	 Boot zippers secure 
L. 	 Helmet tie down - front and back - (slack 
takeup) and locked 
M. 	 ECS inlet nozzle attached +'0 suit and locked 
in position 
N. 	 ECS outlet nozzle uncapped, attached to suit, 
and locked in position 
O. 	 Cobra cable connected 
P. 	 Bio-med cable attached to suit and locked 
Q. 	 Close visor and secure double lock 
5. 	 EMERG CABDi PRESS Valve - ON 
6. 	 Perform PGA verification check (Ref. AOH) 
~ecord on flight log donning times, problems 
encountered, comments, etc. 
ENCLOSURE 20·4 
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CABIN DEPRESSURIZATION - 5 TO 0 PSIA 

INTENTIONAL DUMP TIME - 6 MIN, 11 SEC 
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CONDITIONS: I . EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE ..lector volve ..t to OFF . 
2 . CABIN REPRESS monuol volve ..t to cI... . 
3 . CABIN PRESSURE REUEF volve set to DUMP. 
4 . Normal cabin p.....ure regulotoll outomotically cI... at 
3 . 5 poia . 
SM-2A-890 
Figure 2.7-11. Cabin Depressurization Rates (Sheet 1 of 2) 
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CABIN REPRESSURIZATION - 0 TO 5 PSIA * 

MINIMUM TIME - 52 MIN, 22 SEC 
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CONDITIONS , I . EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE sele'ctor .al.e set to NORMAl. 
2. 	 CABIN REPRESS manual .al.e set to OPEN. 
3 . 	 When surge tank preuure indicator decreases to 150 poia, EMERGENCY 
CABI N PRESSURE selector .al.e set to OFF; surge tank minimum 
preuure (150 psial maintained by regulating CABI N REPRESS manual 
V'al"e until \lol .... e is full open and surge tank preuure storts to increase. 
4 . 	 NolTnol cabin pressure f'e'gulQfon automatically open at 3 . 5 psio . 
5 . 	 When surge tonk prenure again decreases to 150 plio l CABIN 
REPRESS manual valve regulated to maintain this minimum surge 
tonk pressure . 
6 . 	 When cabin preuure indicator reaches 5 .0 psio, nannol cobin 
preuure regulato" automatically clOle and CABI N REPRESS manual 
valve set to close . 
* Requi res 9. lib oxygen at 70° F cabin temperature 
Figure Z. 7-12. Cabin RqH( ',; ,;uri z ation Hate'S (Shee1 
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C 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 

AC 
AOH 
CAM 
ccw 
CIRC 
CIM 
COMM 
COMPR 
CONT 
cw 
LEB 
LH 
MAX Q 
O2 
P 
PRESS 
RH 
S 
SEL 
SEQ 
TV 
UCD 
Alternating Current 
Apollo Operations Hanrth ')oi< 
Command Pilot 
Camera 
Counterc lockwi se 
Circuit 
Command Module 
Communications 
Compressor 
Control 
Clockwise 
Left Equipment Bay 
Left Hand 
Maximum Dynamic Pressure 
Oxygen 
Pilot 
Pressurization 
Right Hand 
Senior Pilot 
Selector 
Sequence 
Televi sion 
Urine Collection Device 
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REPORT OF PANEL 21 

SERVICE MODULE DISPOSITION 

APPENDIX D-21 

TO 

FINAL REPORT OF 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
D-21-1 

A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Service Module Disposition Panel, 21. The task 
assigned for accomplishment by Panel 21 was prescribed as follows: 
This task involves the planning and execution of necessary S/M activity beginning at the time 
of Board approval for Command Module (C/M) demate . This task will be performed mainly by 
appropriate Apollo line organizational elements in accordance with a Board approved plan which 
identifies the Board requirements for documentation and control of this activity. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. MEMBERSHIP: 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Service Module Disposition 
Panel: 
Mr. W. W. Petynia, Chairman, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. R . D. Carothers , Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. B. R. Haight, North American Aviation (NAA), KSC 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Mr. John J. Williams, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) , NASA, Board Member, was assigned to 
monitor the Service Module Disposition Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. The Panel discharged its responsibilities to the Board by planning and executing the following major 
S/M activities: 
a . Demated the Service Module/Service Module Lunar Module Adapter (SM/SLA) from the Launch 
Vehicle (LV) and moved the SM/SLA to the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building (MSOB) . 
b. Performed a detailed inspection of both the exterior and interior areas of the S/M . 
c . Performed detailed systems tests of all S/M systems mechanically or electrically connected to 
the e/M at the time of the accident. 
Following demate of the C/M at Launch Complex 34 (LC34) , the activIties to demate the 
S/M and perform detailed systems tests were in accordance with a board approved plan (Board 
Action 0163). Specific tasks performed in executing this plan were conducted in the following 
general areas: 
(1) INSPECTION AT LC 34. Following demate of the C/M, a visual inspection was made 
on February 17 and 18 by structural engineers to verify the structural integrity of the S/M and 
determine the handling method to be utilized to lower the SM/SLA from the LV and transport 
to MSOB. 
(2) DEMATE AND MOVE TO MSOB. The SM/SLA combination was demated from the 
LV and moved to the MSOB on February 23, 1967. The SM/SLA was positioned in MSOB 
Integrated No. 1 stand in preparation for separation of S/M and SLA. 
(3) DEMATE SM/SLA. Following demate of the S/M and SLA all pyrotechnic devices were 
removed from the SLA. Electrical continuity tests of the S/M and SLA interface wiring were 
made. The S/M was positioned in the H14-134 stand to remove the Service Propulsion System 
(SPS) nozzle extension and then moved to the H14-124 stand for access to perform the detailed 
inspections and systems tests. The SPS nozzle extension was reclassified to Category "c" by the 
204 Review Board on March 3 (Material Release Record No. 0140) and placed in storage. The 
SLA was reclassified to Category "c" by the 204 Review Board on March 4 (Material Release 
Record No. 0142) and returned to the Apollo line organizations for storage. 
(4) DETAILED INSPECTION IN MSOB. A detailed inspection was made of both the ex­
terior and interior areas of the S/M (See Enclosure 21-2) . The inspection was carried out in two 
phases by two different groups. The first phase was conducted with the S/M Reaction Control 
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System Panels (RCS QUAD) open and the top deck Mylar insulation in place. The second phase 
was made with the top deck Mylar removed. In order to provide access and visibility during the 
inspections, the following hardware was removed: 
(a) Sector I access door. 
(b) Sector IV access door. 
(c) SPS flame shield. 
The two groups inspecting the S/M were composed of both NASA and NAA personnel. . The 
first group consisted of Quality Control Inspectors. The second group consisted of systems engineers 
and representatives of Apollo 204 Review Panels. Both groups included the following areas in their 
detailed inspection: 
(a) Top deck of S/M (Mylar on). 
(b) Top deck of S/M (Mylar off) . 
(c) Exterior areas. 
(d) Sector 4 areas. 
(e) Cryogenic areas. 
(f) SPS engine compartment. 
(g) Bottom of S/M 
(h) Quad A and Quad A access area . 
(i) Quad B and Quad B access area. 
(j) Quad C and Quad C access area. 
(k) Quad D and Quad D access area. 
During the detailed inspection, appropriate photographs were taken and summary findings 
written. All hardware items removed for the inspection were reinstalled. 
(5) SYSTEMS TESTS. Following the detailed inspection, specific detailed systems tests were 
made for the following systems: 
(a) 	ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 

The Electrical Power System (EPS) tests consisted of the following: 

(1) Selected resistance checks through the CM / SM umbilical, and the flyaway umbilical 
were performed prior to removal of DC Power Distribution Box (DC PDB). 
(bl ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
The Environmental Control System (ECS) tests consisted of the following: 
(1) The water/glycol remaining in the S/M was drained and transferred to the Pyro­
technic Installation Building (PIB) and placed in bonded storage to be included with that 
from the C/M. 
(2) The integrity and condition of the water/glycol system was determined by leak 
check with dry nitrogen. 
(c) 	PROPULSION SYSTEM 

The Propulsion System tests consisted of the following: 

(1) The operation and condition of the Propellant Utilization Gaging System (PUGS) 
controller was determined in the EPS Laboratory. The tests of the controller were made 
using the SPS PUGS Bench Maintenance Equipment. After completing the tests, the PUGS 
controller was reinstalled in the S/M. 
(2) The operation and condition of the SPS Flight Combustion Stability Monitor 
(FCSM) amplifier and relay box were investigated. 
(3) Samples of all foreign material found in the upward pointing RCS engine nozzles 
(-X thrust) for all four engines was collected. These samples were sent to the Material 
Analysis Branch laboratory for quantitative analysis. 
(d) 	INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM 

The Instrumentation System test consisted of the following: 

(1) Resistance measurements of the SM / SLA separation monitor circuits were made. 
(2) The SM/SLA separation monitor was removed and sent to the PIB for component 
analysis. 
(e) 	FUEL CELL/ECS OXYGEN SYSTEM 

The Fuel Cell/ECS Oxygen System tests consisted of the following: 
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(1) The integrity of that portion of the cryogenic system used to supply breathing 
oxygen to the astronauts at the time of the accident was determined. The ~xygen. line 
was pressurized to 500 psi with dry helium and the pressure decay over a thlrty-mmute 
period was measured. 	 . 
(2) The operation and condition of the fuel cell reactant valves was determmed. The 
continuity between the contacts on the shut-off valves was determined. Resistance to ground 
through the solenoids of each of the valves was made to determine any grounding of any 
of the coils. 
(3) The continuity through the fuel cell switch used to control the individual fuel cell 
heaters was determined . With the switch disconnected, the resistance through the coil of 
the motor switch to S/M ground point was measured . 
(4) The continuity through the holding current switch contacts was determined. With 
the switch disconnected, the resistance through the coil of the motor switches to S/M 
ground point was measured. . . 
(5) The continuity through the tank heater control switch contacts was determmed . 
With the motor switches disconnected, the resistance through the coil of the motor switch 
to S/M ground was measured. 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. FINDINGS 
Detailed inspections of the S/M interior and exterior areas by Quality Control Inspectors, systems 
engineers and 204 Panel Members (References 21-1 thru 21-4) found the S/M suffered minor damage by 
fire. (See Enclosures 21-3 and 21-4.) 
DETERMINATION 
a. There is no indication that the S/M was the origin of the fire. 
b. The fire damage to the S/M resulted from a source located above the S/M. 
2. FINDINGS 
Test results indicate S/M motor switch S-6 in the DC PDB was transferred to the closed position 
resulting in fuel cell No. 2 harness being connected to Bus B (Reference 21-5). The control switches 
in the C/M were found in the off position. 
DETERMINATION 
It was determined by examination of resistance checks of the C/M wIrIng made at the CM/SM 
umbilical connector P/] 12 that the control wiring in the C/M was shorted causing the S/M motor 
switch to transfer. 
3. 	FINDINGS: 
Fuel Cell No.2 hydrogen shut-off valve was found In the open position (Reference 21-6). 
DETERMINATION: 
It was determined by examination of resistance checks of the C/M wiring made at the CM/SM 
umbilical connector P /] 12 that the control wiring in the C/M was shorted causing the valve to open. 
Telemetry data up to loss of signal (LOS) from the C/M show the valve closed indicating opening 
was a result of the accident. 
4. FINDINGS: 
Test results indicated that the hydrogen tank No. 2 heater wiring circuit was open (Reference 
21-7). 
DETERMINATION: 
It was determined that the S/M wirIng was proper and that the open circuit existed in the heater 
circuit (containing thermal switches) inside the tank. This condition is not considered abnormal because 
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the thermal switches in series with the heater element open at 80"F (±10") (Reference 21-8). Ambient 
temperature was well within this range of temperatures. 
5. FINDINGS: 
No shorts or open circuits were found in the wiring for the SM/SLA separation monitor (SS0120X) 
wiring. but the fuse in the S28A7 fuse box was found to be open (Reference 21-9). 
DETERMINATION: 
Prior to moving the S/M to LC 34 the separation monitor tape was inadvertently pulled out of 
its case and subsequently pushed back in. It was determined by investigation (Reference 21-10) that 
pushing the tape back in would cause the tape to short-to-case and thus blow the fuse . 
6. 	FINDINGS: 
Test results failed to show any S/M anomalies due to the S/M systems (Reference 21-5 thru 21-16) . 
DETERMINATION: 

There is no indication the S/M systems were responsible for initiating the accident. 

E. SUPPORTING DATA 
Enclosures Description 
21-1 Not Used . 
21-2 General arrangements of S/M and sectors 
21-3 Top deck of S/M with Mylar installed 
21-4 Top deck of S/M with Mylar removed 
21-5 List of References 
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Sill CIIYO TKS, PIIOPULSION 
SII2 EPS IIADIATOII 
SIIS He SEIIVICIHG (sPS) 
SII4 SEQ, IATTEIIIU, fUEL CELLS, Sl4AU • 114A1 CI I'IUIELI 
SIIS IICS QUAD He, OX, fUEL SEll" TPI, IS THIIU to 
SII4 EPS IIADIATOil 
SliT EPS IIADIATOil 
slia ECS IlADIATOil 
11ft ECS IIADIATOil 
SIlIO SECTOII 1II 
SIlII SECTOII m 
1I .3!1!1 ­ - f-----"r---,-----'---r---r----'--,-"""'=l"""-,---,------'--.---T::~=l 
... ' 
.... 
.,zo o -- . l========~~-----,.~~~..~~~~~~ii~-------~-------.J 
.0· 
+z 
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SECTOllm 
SIlII 
SECTOII IX 
III a 
-Hr"'''''<~-t1I?-+'' 0" 
SECTOillIl 
11110 -z 
170" 
SECTOII I 
1111 
.IU 
1118 
VIEW LOOKING AFT 
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF SM SECTORS 
ENCLOSURE 21· 2 
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ENCLOSURE 21-3 

TOP DECK OF SERVICE MODULE WITH MYLAR INSTALLED 

TOP DECK OF SERVICE MODULE WITH MYLAR REMOVED 
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TOP DECK OF SERVICE MODULE WITH MYLAR REMOVED 
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REFERENCE 21· 12: 
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REFERENCE 21- 14: 
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RE FERENCE 21· 16: 
REFERENCES 
Inspection of S/ M top deck after CM demate. TPS No. 
SI C 012- SI C 099, dated February 16, 1967. 
Quality Control Inspection of S/ M. TPS 1'010.012- SM·IV· 003 
dated February 27, 1967. 
Engineering Inspection of S/ M. TPS No. 012· SM ·IV· 004 
dated February 27, 1967. 
Dry and Clean -x RCS Engines. TPS No. 012· SM· OOB 
dated March 1, 1967. 
S14A 1 Motor Switch Analysis. TPS 1'010.012· SM· CA. 001 
dated March 8, 1967. 
Fuel Cell and CGSS Investigation. TPS No. 12· SM· IV • 012 
dated Marc h 2, 1967. 
Continuity Check· Specific S/ M Circuits. TPS No. 
12- SM·IV· 007 dated March 1, 1967. 
Hydrogen Tank No. 2 Heater checkout. TPS No. 
SI C 012·SM·IV·016 dated March 11,1967. 
Separation Monitor Investigation (SS0120X). TPS No. 
012·SM·IV·002dated February 24,196.7. 
Separation Monitor Investigation. TPS No. SIC 012·SM·CA· 
002 dated March 9, 1967. 
SM Water Glycol Deservicing. TPSNo.12.SM·IV.013 
dated March 4, 1967. 
PUGS Control Unit Test. TPS No. 012 SM ·IV· 005 dated 
February 27, 1967. 
FCSM Checkout. TPS No. 012~ SM· IV ·009 dated 
March 2, 1967. 
Remove Liquid from Quad B Engine No. 3 for Analysis. 
TPS No. 12·SM·MA·001. 
Leak Check of ECS Supply Lines. TPS No. 012·SM·IV·OI0 
dated February 15, 1967. 
SLA Wiring Resistance Check. TPS No. 12·SLA.IV.002 
dated March 2, 1967. 
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